Optimal Control of Debt-to-GDP Ratio in an N-state Regime Switching
  Economy by Ferrari, Giorgio & Rodosthenous, Neofytos
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO
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Abstract. We solve an infinite time-horizon bounded-variation stochastic control problem with regime
switching between N states. This is motivated by the problem of a government that wants to control
the country’s debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio. In our formulation, the debt-to-GDP ratio
evolves stochastically in continuous time, and its drift – given by the interest rate on government debt,
net of the growth rate of GDP – is affected by an exogenous macroeconomic risk process modelled by a
continuous-time Markov chain with N states. The government can act on the public debt by increasing
or decreasing its level, and it aims at minimising a net expected cost functional. Without relying on a
guess-and-verify approach, but performing a direct probabilistic study, we show that it is optimal to keep
the debt-to-GDP ratio in an interval, whose boundaries depend on the states of the risk process. These
boundaries are given through a zero-sum optimal stopping game with regime switching with N states and
we completely characterise them as solutions to a system of nonlinear algebraic equations with constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, such a result appears here for the first time. Finally, we put in practice our
methodology in a case study of a Markov chain with N = 2 states; we provide a thorough analysis and
we complement our theoretical results by a detailed numerical study on the sensitivity of the optimal debt
ratio management policy with respect to the problem’s parameters.
Keywords: singular stochastic control, zero-sum optimal stopping game, free-boundary problem,
regime switching, debt-to-GDP ratio.
MSC2010 subject classification: 93E20, 60G40, 60J60, 60J27, 91B64.
1. Introduction
It has been observed that during the financial crisis that started in 2007, debt-to-GDP ratio (also called
the “debt ratio”) exploded from an average of 53% to circa 80% in many countries. Ever since, there has
been a huge debate in the economic and political community on the sustainability of public debt. Using
different statistical and methodological approaches, many researchers conclude that high government debt
has negative economic and financial effects, as it makes the economy less resilient to macroeconomic shocks
(e.g. sovereign default risks and liquidity shocks), and poses limits to the adoption of counter-cyclical fiscal
policies (see [25], among many others). The common view derived from the empirical evidence is that,
from the perspective of a government’s general economic planning, it is important to reduce high levels
of debt ratio in order to maintain fiscal sustainability and support stronger fundamentals. However, in
[22] researchers from the International Monetary Fund also suggest that reducing the debt ratio might
not be always the most sensible approach. The conclusion seems to apply in particular to those countries
enjoying sufficient “fiscal space”1, like U.S.A., Germany and the U.K.. When deciding their economic
planning, governments are presented with two questions: How much is too much? and How low is too
low?. In this paper, we propose a mathematical formulation of the optimal debt ratio’s management
problem faced by a government that addresses both of these questions.
In our model, the GDP of the country is a geometric Brownian motion with growth rate g and volatility
(per unit of GDP) σ. The real debt evolves exponentially with rate r+λYt , which is the interest rate on debt
that the government pays at time t. This consists of a fixed deterministic component r and a stochastic,
time-varying component λYt . As a matter of fact, this is a generalisation of the standard exponential
Date: February 18, 2019.
1This is the distance between the government’s debt ratio and an “upper limit”, calculated by the Moody’s ratings agency,
beyond which the government should reduce debt in order to avoid default.
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2 FERRARI, RODOSTHENOUS
evolution of real debt with constant rate that one can find in classical textbooks of macroeconomics (see
[2], among others). The stochastic, time-varying component of the interest rate is driven by a continuous-
time Markov chain Y with N states, modelling market factors that are not under the control of the
government. In this sense, λYt is the additional interest that the government pays on debt at time t, e.g.
due to a change of the credit rating of the country, or to a mass sell-off of government bonds. As a result,
in absence of any intervention, the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves stochastically following geometric dynamics
with regime switching in the drift r + λYt − g.
When in debt, the government incurs an instantaneous cost which may be interpreted as an opportunity
cost resulting, e.g., from private investments crowding out, less room for financing public investments,
and from a tendency to suffer low subsequent growth (see [25], among others, for empirical studies). The
government may intervene in order to decrease or increase the level of the debt ratio, and we assume that
these policies have an instantaneous effect. Consequently, the cumulative amount of debt ratio’s increase
and decrease are the government’s control variables. Any decrease of the debt ratio by the government
results in proportional costs, whereas any increase results in proportional benefits. The objective of the
government is to minimise the total expected discounted costs incurred by debt and the cost of decreasing
the debt ratio, net of the benefits arising from an increase of the latter by the government.
The mathematical formulation associated with the above problem is that of a bounded-variation sto-
chastic control problem in which the state process is a linearly controlled geometric Brownian motion with
regime-switching. This is due to the N -state Markov chain Y affecting the interest rate to be paid on
debt. We succeed in determining the explicit solution to this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper which completely solves a singular stochastic control problem with: (i) regime switching
between an arbitrary number N ≥ 2 of states and (ii) controls of bounded-variation.
We solve this problem without relying on a classical guess-and-verify approach. Indeed, if we attempt
to follow such an approach, we should solve a system of N coupled ordinary differential equations with
gradient constraints (the coupling is through the transition rates of the Markov chain Y ), and then
verify that the obtained solution satisfies the dynamic programming equation which takes the form of
a variational inequality. Given the complexity of the problem under consideration, this approach seems
not to be feasible. In fact, even in the example of N = 2 regimes addressed in Section 6, the guess-and-
verify approach would require proving existence and uniqueness of a quadruple solving a highly nonlinear
system of four algebraic equations with constraints (see (6.5)–(6.8) with (6.9)–(6.10) below). Obviously,
the complexity increases with N (see Remark 6.1).
Instead, here we tackle the problem via a direct probabilistic approach, by relating the bounded-variation
stochastic control problem to a zero-sum game of optimal stopping (Dynkin game) with regime-switching.
This is accomplished by first proving an abstract existence and uniqueness result for the optimal debt-
management policy, upon relying on a suitable application of Komlo´s’ theorem (see also [10] and [20]).
Using this result, we apply Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20], and provide the form of a Dynkin game with
regime switching, whose value v coincides with the first derivative of the control problem’s value function
V . We then study the Dynkin game by employing mostly probabilistic arguments, and we prove the
structure of its saddle point. This consists of a couple of entry times to two connected regions (the so-
called “stopping regions”) whose boundaries a and b depend on the current regime of the Markov chain
Y . For any such regime i, we then prove that v is everywhere continuously differentiable, thus implying
the well-known smooth-fit condition of v at the boundaries of the stopping regions. Such a regularity
of v, in turn, immediately gives that V is C2 for any regime i. Hence, through this direct approach,
we manage to prove that V is a classical solution to the corresponding dynamic programming equation,
which we use to provide the structure of an optimal control rule. At any time, this prescribes to keep
the (optimally) controlled debt ratio process inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)], either in a minimal way (i.e.
according to a Skorokhod reflection) if it is already inside, or with an immediate jump, if it suddenly goes
outside (i.e. according to a lump-sum increase/decrease). Thus, these two levels defining the interval,
trigger the timing at which the government should optimally intervene to either increase or decrease the
debt ratio. It is worth noticing that the aforementioned methodology can also be applied to solve other
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singular or bounded-variation stochastic control problems under regime-switching with such an arbitrary
number N ≥ 2 of states. These could be natural directions for future research.
In order to prove the existence of an optimal control policy we need to impose a condition on the
(constant) marginal costs of increasing and decreasing the debt ratio. Interestingly, this condition also
plays a fundamental role in establishing an ordering of the optimal stopping boundaries a(i) and b(i) across
the N different regimes i. In particular, this general result can be exploited to provide the geometry of
the stopping regions and the structure of the value function of the Dynkin game. As a byproduct, one can
determine the explicit equations that the optimal boundaries a and b necessarily satisfy. These equations
follow from the C1-property of v previously proved. We put in practice our methodology in Section 6 in
a case study of N = 2 regimes. To the best of our knowledge, also the study of the case with N = 2
regimes appears in this paper for the first time. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by a
detailed numerical study on the sensitivity of the optimal debt ratio management policy with respect to
the problem’s parameters.
Our paper is placed among those few works employing continuous-time singular stochastic control
methods for public debt management. In [5] and [6], the debt ratio evolves as a linearly controlled one-
dimensional geometric Brownian motion and the government can only reduce its level through singular
controls and bounded-velocity controls, respectively. The objective is to minimise the total expected costs
arising from having debt and intervening on it. Instead, in our model, the government can both reduce and
increase the debt ratio, and the dynamics of the latter is affected by two sources of uncertainty: a Brownian
motion and a continuous-time Markov chain. In [8], the problem is again to only optimally reduce the
debt ratio, but in this case the government takes into consideration the evolution of the inflation rate of
the country. The latter evolves as an uncontrolled diffusion process which makes the problem a fully two-
dimensional singular stochastic control problem. This clearly leads to a completely different mathematical
treatment than this paper. In [7], a partially informed government on the underlying business conditions,
once again only reduces the debt ratio. By adopting filtering techniques, the government’s optimal control
problem is reduced to one under full information, and then solved in a case study.
Also the literature on singular stochastic control problems with regime switching is still limited, and
most of the papers deal only with Markov chains with N = 2 states and with monotone controls. We
refer, e.g., to [17] and [28] where the optimal dividend problem of actuarial science is formulated as a
one-dimensional monotone follower problem; to [15] for an irreversible investment problem; to the recent
[9] for an optimal extraction problem. In this paper, we provide the complete solution to a singular
stochastic control problem under regime switching with N ≥ 2 states, where the control processes are not
monotone but have paths of bounded variation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and provide the
control problem formulation of the government. In Section 3, we prove the existence and uniqueness of
the optimal debt ratio management policy, and we introduce the associated Dynkin game. In Section 4,
we study the Dynkin game and we characterise its saddle point. These results are then used in Section
5 to construct the optimal debt ratio management policy. A case study with N = 2 regimes is then
considered in Section 6, for which we also provide a detailed comparative statics analysis (see Section 6.2)
and comparison with the non-regime-switching case (see Section 6.3).
2. Setting and Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space rich enough to accommodate a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W := (Wt)t≥0 and a continuous-time Markov chain Y := (Yt)t≥0. To be more precise, Y is such
that for all t ≥ 0, Yt ∈ M := {1, 2, . . . , N} for some N ≥ 2, and it has an irreducible generator matrix
Q := (qij)1≤i,j≤N with
P(Yt+∆t = j |Yt = i, Ys, s ≤ t) :=

qij∆t+ o(∆t) if j 6= i
1 + qii∆t+ o(∆t) if j = i.
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Here qij ≥ 0 for (i, j) ∈ M ×M with j 6= i, and qii = −
∑
j 6=i qij < 0 for each i ∈ M. The Markov
chain Y jumps between the states at exponentially distributed random times, and the constant qij gives
the rate of jumping from state i to j. We take Y independent of W , and denote by F := {Ft, t ≥ 0} the
filtration jointly generated by W and Y , and as usual, augmented by P-null sets.
We assume that in absence of any intervention by the government, the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves
according to the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
(2.1) dX0t =
(
r + λYt − g
)
X0t dt+ σX
0
t dWt, t > 0, X
0
0 = x > 0.
These dynamics might be seen as a stochastic version of the one proposed in classical macroeconomic
textbooks, see e.g. [2]. Here g ∈ R is the growth rate of the GDP, whereas r + λYt is the interest rate
on government debt. This interest rate consists of a basis fixed component r > 0, and of a time-varying
stochastic component λYt which represents the additional interest rate that the country has to pay at
time t when the macroeconomic conditions are in state Yt ∈M.
Assumption 2.1. Without loss of generality, we assume that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN , hence λYt ∈ [λN , λ1],
P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
In the following we will often denote by Xx,i,0 the unique strong solution to (2.1) starting at time zero
from level x > 0 when Y0 = i ∈M; that is,
(2.2) Xx,i,0t = xe
(r−g− 1
2
σ2)t+
∫ t
0 λY is
ds+σWt , t ≥ 0.
We also denote by Y it the Markov chain Yt started from state i ∈M at initial time.
Remark 2.2. Dynamics (2.1) can be justified in the following way. In absence of any intervention by the
government, the nominal debt Dt grows at time t ≥ 0 at rate r+λYt; i.e., dDt = (r+λYt)Dtdt. Assuming
that the GDP, ψ, evolves stochastically as a
dψt = gψtdt+ σψtdWt,
an application of Itoˆ’s formula shows that X0 := D/ψ follows the geometric dynamics (2.1).
The government can increase or decrease the current level of the debt-to-GDP ratio by, e.g., making
investments on infrastructures or imposing austerity policies in the form of spending cuts, respectively.
Denoting by ηt the cumulative amount, e.g., of spending cuts made up to time t ≥ 0 in order to reduce
the debt-to-GDP ratio, and by ξt the cumulative amount, e.g, of investments made up to time t ≥ 0, the
dynamics of the adjusted debt-to-GDP ratio read as
(2.3) dXt =
(
r + λYt − g
)
Xtdt+ σXtdWt + dξt − dηt, t > 0, X0 = x ∈ R+.
Given that ξ and η represent the cumulative interventions, it is natural to model them as nondecreasing
stochastic processes, adapted with respect to the available flow of information F. Hence we take ξ and η
in the set
U :={ϑ : Ω× R+ → R+, F-adapted and such that t 7→ ϑt is a.s.nondecreasing and left-continuous}.
In the following, we set ϑ0 = 0 a.s. for any ϑ ∈ U . We suppose that the government cannot make at the
same instant in time lump-sum interventions to increase and decrease the debt ratio; i.e., we assume that
the increments ∆ξt = ξt+ − ξt and ∆ηt := ηt+ − ηt are supported on disjoint subsets of R+. We then
denote by ϕ the process belonging to
V :={ζ : Ω× R+ → R, F-adapted and such that t 7→ ζt is a.s.
(locally) of bounded variation, left-continuous and ζ0 = 0},
whose unique minimal decomposition is given by the two nondecreasing processes ξ and η; that is, ϕt =
ξt − ηt, for all t ≥ 0.
For any ϕ = ξ − η ∈ V, equation (2.3) admits the unique strong solution
(2.4) Xx,i,ϕt = X
1,i,0
t
[
x+
∫
[0,t)
dξs
X1,i,0s
−
∫
[0,t)
dηs
X1,i,0s
]
, t ≥ 0,
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where we have stressed the dependency on ϕ ∈ V and on the initial datum (x, i) ∈ R+ ×M by writing
Xx,i,ϕ. Here, Xx,i,0 is as in (2.2), and it is the unique strong solution to (2.3) when ξ = η ≡ 0 and
therefore ϕ ≡ 0.
Having a debt level Xt at time t ≥ 0 the government incurs an instantaneous cost h(Xt). This may
be interpreted as an opportunity cost resulting from private investments’ crowding out, less room for
financing public investments, and from a tendency to suffer low subsequent growth.
We make the following standing assumption on the running cost function h : R 7→ R+.
Assumption 2.3.
(i) x 7→ h(x) is strictly convex, continuously differentiable and increasing on [0,∞), and it is such
that h(x) = 0 for any x ≤ 0;
(ii) the derivative h′ of h satisfies h′(0) = 0 and limx→∞ h′(x) = +∞;
(iii) there exists m > 1, K1 > 0, K2 > 0 and K3 > 0 such that
h(x) ≤ K1(1 + |x|m) and |h′(x)| ≤ K2(1 + |x|m−1), x ∈ R,
and
|h′(x)− h′(y)| ≤ K3|x− y|(1 + |x|(m−2)+), (x, y) ∈ R2;
(iv) h has finite Legendre transform on (0,∞); that is, for all p > 0 we have supx∈R+
(
px−h(x)) <∞.
Remark 2.4. It is worth noticing that a cost function of the form h(x) = 12x
2 for any x > 0 and h(x) = 0
for any x ≤ 0 satisfies Assumption 2.3. Moreover, the assumption h(0) = 0 is without loss of generality,
since if h(0) = ho > 0 then one can always set ĥ(x) := h(x)− ho and write h(x) = ĥ(x) + ho, so that the
optimisation problem (cf. (2.7) below) remains unchanged up to an additive constant. Notice that such
a requirement, together with h′(0) = 0, implies that any infinitesimal amount of debt does not generate
holding costs for the country; indeed, h(ε) ≈ h′(0)ε = 0.
Whenever the government decides to reduce the level of debt ratio, it incurs an intervention cost that
is proportional to the amount of debt reduction (see also [5] and [8]). This might be seen as a measure of
the social and financial consequences deriving from a debt-reduction policy, and the associated constant
marginal cost c1 > 0 allows to express it in monetary terms. On the other hand, the government can
increase the current level of debt ratio (e.g. through investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education
and research, etc.), and we assume that this has a positive social and financial effect, thus overall reduces
the total expected “costs” of the government. The marginal benefit of increasing debt ratio is a strictly
positive constant c2 > 0.
Assuming that the government discounts at a rate ρ > 0, the total expected cost functional, net of
investment benefits, is
(2.5) Jx,i(ϕ) := E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρth(Xϕt )dt+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξt
]
,
where, for any (x, i) ∈ O := R+ ×M, E(x,i) denotes the expectation under the measure P(x,i)( · ) :=
P( · |Xϕ0 = x, Y0 = i). In the following we will equivalently write E[f(Xx,i,ϕt )] = E(x,i)[f(Xϕt )], for any
t ≥ 0 and Borel-measurable function f : R → R such that the previous expectation is finite. Hereafter,
we use the notation
∫ t
0 ( · )dϑs =
∫
[0,t)( · )dϑs, for ϑ ∈ {ξ, η} and any t ∈ [0,∞].
For any given initial value of the debt ratio x ≥ 0 and of the state of the economy i ∈ M, we
assume that the government will not use a debt ratio management policy leading to infinite cost/benefit
of interventions, and given that the debt ratio level is always a positive number, the government picks its
debt ratio management policy ϕ in the set
A(x, i) :=
{
ϕ ∈ V : E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dηt + dξt
)]
<∞ and Xx,i,ϕt ≥ 0 P⊗ dt− a.e.
}
.(2.6)
The government’s aim is therefore to solve
(2.7) V (x, i) := inf
ϕ∈A(x,i)
Jx,i(ϕ), (x, i) ∈ O.
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We will refer to V as the value function, and any debt ratio management policy belonging to A will be
called admissible.
The following assumption on the model’s parameters will hold true in the rest of this paper.
Assumption 2.5. The model’s parameters satisfy
c1
c2
>
ρ− r + g − λN
ρ− r + g − λ1 .
Since λN ≤ λ1, Assumption 2.5 in particular implies the condition c1 > c2. This is typically assumed in
the literature on bounded-variation stochastic control problems in order to ensure well-posedness of the
optimisation problem (see, e.g., [10] and [16]) and to avoid arbitrage opportunities. Assumption 2.5 will
play a central role in the proof of existence of an optimal debt ratio management policy for problem (2.7)
(see the proof of Lemma 3.3 below). It is also worth noticing that Assumption 2.5 will have important
implications on the geometry of the state space (see Proposition 4.4 below).
3. On the Existence of the Optimal Debt Ratio Management Policy
In this section we prove some preliminary properties of the value function, the existence and uniqueness
of an optimal debt ratio management policy for problem (2.7), and its relation to a zero-sum game of
optimal stopping (Dynkin game).
We start with the following result, whose proof is standard and therefore omitted.
Proposition 3.1. The value function V of (2.7) is such that x 7→ V (x, i) is convex on R+ for any i ∈M.
Moreover, V (x, i) ≤ c1x for all (x, i) ∈ O.
To take care of the infinite time-horizon of our problem we need the following assumption, which will
also hold throughout the rest of this paper.
Assumption 3.2. Recall m from Assumption 2.3. The model’s parameters satisfy
ρ >
(
(r − g + λ1) ∨
(
m(r − g + λ1) + σ
2
2
m(m− 1)))+.
Assumption 3.2 may be justified by noting that the government, which runs only for a limited amount
of years, is more concerned about the present than the future, and therefore discounts future costs and
benefits at a sufficiently large rate. Moreover, a combination of the condition ρ > (m(r − g + λ1) +
σ2
2 m(m − 1))+ with Assumption 2.3-(iii), ensures that the trivial admissible policy “do not intervene at
all on the debt ratio” yields a finite expected cost, even if it is not necessarily the minimal one.
Notice that setting
(3.1) ξt :=
∫ t
0
dξs
X1,i,0s
and ηt :=
∫ t
0
dηs
X1,i,0s
, ξ0 = 0 = η0,
and ϕ := ξ − η, the solution to (2.4) rewrites as
(3.2) Xx,i,ϕt = X
1,i,0
t
[
x+ ξt − ηt
]
, t ≥ 0.
The quantities dξt and dηt are the sizes of interventions made at time t ≥ 0, per unit of debt ratio in
absence of any intervention.
Then, by defining A, for any (x, i) ∈ O, as
A(x, i) :=
{
ϕ ∈ V : E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t
(
dηt + dξt
)]
<∞ and x+ ξt − ηt ≥ 0 P⊗ dt− a.e.
}
,
it is easy to see that the mapping A(x, i) 3 ϕ 7→ ϕ ∈ A(x, i) is one-to-one and onto, and one can also
write for any (x, i) ∈ O
V (x, i) = inf
ϕ∈A(x,i)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρth
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξt − ηt
])
dt+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t dηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t dξt
]
.
(3.3)
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The definitions of ξ and η in (3.1) will be used in the proof of the next result.
Lemma 3.3. Let (x, i) ∈ O be arbitrary but fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence
for problem (2.7) (equivalently, (3.3)). Then
(3.4) sup
n∈N
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηnt +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξnt
]
<∞.
Proof. Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence for
problem (2.7) (equivalently, (3.3)). Without loss of generality, we can take (ϕn)n∈N such that
1 + V (x, i) ≥ Jx,i(ϕn), for any n,
and then recalling that V (x, i) ≤ c1x due to Proposition 3.1, it follows from (2.5) and (3.2) that
1 + c1x ≥ 1 + V (x, i) ≥ Jx,i(ϕn) =E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρth
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
])
dt
]
+ E(x,i)
[
c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηnt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξnt
]
.(3.5)
By Assumption 2.3-(iv), for any ε > 0 there exists κε > 0 such that h(x) ≥ εx−κε for any x ∈ R+. Taking
this into account together with the monotonicity of h in Assumption 2.3-(i), (2.2) and the positivity of
xX1,i,0, we can therefore continue from (3.5) by writing
1 + c1x ≥ −κε
ρ
+ εE
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t
(
ξ
n
t − ηnt
)
dt
]
+ E(x,i)
[
c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηnt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξnt
]
.(3.6)
Notice now that due to (3.1) we have for either (ϑn, ϑ
n
) = (ξn, ξ
n
) or (ϑn, ϑ
n
) = (ηn, ηn) that
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t ϑ
n
t dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t
(∫ t
0
dϑns
X1,i,0s
)
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
1
X1,i,0s
E
[ ∫ ∞
s
e−ρtX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fs] dϑns],(3.7)
where Tonelli’s theorem and Theorem 57 in Chapter VI of [11] imply the last equality.
We now want to find a lower bound for E[
∫∞
s e
−ρtX1,i,0t dt|Fs]/X1,i,0s . To accomplish that we notice
that (2.2), the fact that λYt ≥ λN , P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, and a change of variable of integration give
1
X1,i,0s
E
[ ∫ ∞
s
e−ρtX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fs] ≥ e−ρsE[ ∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λN+
1
2
σ2)ueσ(Wu+s−Ws) du
∣∣∣Fs]
= e−ρs
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λN )udu = e−ρsβ2,(3.8)
where we have set β2 := (ρ − r + g − λN )−1 < ∞ by Assumption 3.2. In (3.8) the independence of
Brownian increments, the stationarity of their distribution, and the formula for the Laplace transform of
a Gaussian random variable have been employed in the penultimate step. Analogously, but using now
that λYt ≤ λ1, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, we find
1
X1,i,0s
E
[ ∫ ∞
s
e−ρtX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fs] ≤ e−ρs ∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λ1)udu = e−ρsβ1,(3.9)
with β1 := (ρ− r + g − λ1)−1 <∞ by Assumption 3.2.
Recalling (3.7) and using (3.8) and (3.9) we then find from (3.6) that
1 + c1x+
κε
ρ
≥ (εβ2 − c2)E(x,i)[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξnt
]
+
(
c1 − εβ1
)
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηnt
]
.(3.10)
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The previous estimate holds for any ε > 0. Hence setting Θε(x) := 1 + c1x +
κε
ρ , we can take ε = c2/β2
in (3.10) and obtain
β2 Θ c2
β2
(x) ≥ (c1β2 − c2β1)E(x,i)[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηnt
]
.
On the other hand, by taking ε = c1/β1 in (3.10) we have
β1Θ c1
β1
(x) ≥ (c1β2 − c2β1)E(x,i)[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξnt
]
.
Noticing that c1β2 − c2β1 > 0 by Assumption 2.5, the last two inequalities then give
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dξnt + dη
n
t
)] ≤ β2Θ c2β2 (x) + β1Θ c1β1 (x)
c1β2 − c2β1 ,
which clearly implies (3.4) since the right-hand side of the latter is independent of n. 
In view of Lemma 3.3, we can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed. There exists a unique (up to undistinguishability)
optimal debt ratio management policy ϕ? = ξ? − η? for the problem (2.7).
Proof. Uniqueness (up to undistinguishability) of the optimal debt management policy is due, as usual,
to the strict convexity of the cost functional and to the affine structure of the controlled state variable
with respect to the control. Therefore, in the following we only prove existence of an optimal control.
Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence for problem
(2.7). By (3.4) in Lemma 3.3 we deduce that
sup
n∈N
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
ρe−ρt
(
ηnt + ξ
n
t
)
dt
]
<∞;
that is, (ϕn)n∈N is bounded in L1(Ω×R+,P(dω)⊗ρe−ρtdt). Komlo´s’ theorem thus implies that there exists
a subsequence (still denoted by (ϕn)n∈N for simplicity of notation) and a pair of measurable processes ξ?
and η? such that the Cesa`ro sequences
ξ̂n :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
ξj → ξ? and η̂n := 1
n
n∑
j=1
ηj → η?, P⊗ ρe−ρtdt− a.e.
Hence, setting ϕ̂n := ξ̂n− η̂n and ϕ? := ξ?−η?, we get ϕ̂n → ϕ?, P⊗ρe−ρtdt-a.e. Arguing as in Lemmata
4.5-4.7 of [18] (notice indeed that our a.e. convergence implies the weak convergence employed in that
paper) one can show that ξ? and η? admit modifications – that we still denote by ξ? and η? – that are
nondecreasing, left-continuous and F-adapted; that is, ϕ? ∈ V, and Xx,i,ϕ?t ≥ 0, P⊗ dt-a.e.
Moreover, it follows from Portmanteau theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 2.1 in [1]) that P-a.s.
lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
fs dξ̂
n
s =
∫ ∞
0
fs dξ
?
s and lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
fs dη̂
n
s =
∫ ∞
0
fs dη
?
s ,
for any bounded function f : R+ → R+ that is continuous dξ?-a.e. (resp., dη?-a.e.) on R+. The latter
convergence in particular yields
(3.11) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsdξ̂ns =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsdξ?s and lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsdη̂ns =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsdη?s ,
which by Fatou’s lemma and (3.4) gives E(x,i)[
∫∞
0 e
−ρtdη?t +
∫∞
0 e
−ρtdξ?t ] < ∞, and therefore ϕ? ∈ A.
Furthermore, we have P-a.s. for a.e. t ≥ 0 that
(3.12) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dξ̂ns
X1,i,0s
=
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dξ?s
X1,i,0s
= ξ?t
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(3.13) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dη̂ns
X1,i,0s
=
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dη?s
X1,i,0s
= η?t
upon recalling (3.1) to have the last two equalities in (3.12) and (3.13).
If we can now apply Fatou’s lemma to Jx,i(ϕ̂n) from (2.5) in view of the limits (3.11)–(3.13) and the
expressions (2.4) and (3.2) of Xx,i,ϕ, we obtain that
(3.14) Jx,i(ϕ?) ≤ lim inf
n↑∞
Jx,i(ϕ̂n) = V (x, i),
where we have used that (ϕ̂n)nN is also a minimising sequence due to the convexity of Jx,i( · ) on V. Hence,
ϕ? is optimal.
Therefore, in order to complete the proof of this part, we show in the remaining that Fatou’s lemma
can be indeed applied. Using the change of measure from (4.2) on the expression of Jx,i(·) involved in
(3.3), we can write (see (4.1) as well)
Jx,i(ϕn) = Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
])
dt
]
+ Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
c1dη
n
t − c2dξnt
)]
= Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
])
dt
]
+ Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
ρ− (r − g + λYt)
)(
c1η
n
t − c2ξnt
)
dt
]
,
where an integration by parts for the integrals with respect to dηnt and dξ
n
t and (3.4) have been used to
obtain the last equality. Thus, by defining the random variable
Φn :=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
])
dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
ρ− (r − g + λY it )
)(
c1η
n
t − c2ξnt
)
dt,
we will prove that Fatou’s lemma can be applied in (3.14), if we find an integrable random variable Λ,
independent of n, such that Φn ≥ Λ, P̂-a.s. To this end, using that λN ≤ λY it ≤ λ1, P̂-a.s., and that for
any ε > 0 there exists κε > 0 such that h(x) ≥ εx− κε for any x ∈ R+ (cf. Assumption 2.3-(iv)) together
with (4.3), we can write P̂-a.s. that
Φn ≥− κε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
dt+
εx
ρ− r + g − λN +
(
ε− c2(ρ− r + g − λN )
) ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t ξnt dt
+
(
c1(ρ− r + g − λ1)− ε
) ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t ηnt dt.
Therefore, by taking ε = c1(ρ− r+ g−λ1) in the above expression, and using Assumption 2.5, we obtain
Φn >− κε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
dt+
ρ− r + g − λ1
ρ− r + g − λN c1x =: Λ.
The fact that Λ is clearly an integrable random variable, independent of n, completes the proof. 
The previous theorem ensures existence and uniqueness of an optimal debt ratio management policy,
but it does not directly provide its structure. To determine the form of the optimal debt ratio management
policy, we now exploit the result of Theorem 3.4 and we relate the optimal debt management problem to
a two person zero-sum game of optimal stopping with regime switching. This game might be interpreted
as a game played between the two components of the government; namely, player 1 represents the will to
adopt a restrictive debt policy and player 2 represents the desire to increase spending.
The proof of the next proposition follows by suitably applying results in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20].
It is important to remark that in [20] the set of admissible controls does not require that the controlled
process remains positive. However, the proof of Theorem 3.2 therein is based on the construction of
suitable perturbations of the optimal control and one may easily verify that such perturbations of the
optimal control preserve positivity of the process provided that the optimal control does.
In the rest of the paper, we set gx(x, i) :=
∂g
∂x(x, i) for any function g : O → R, and we now provide a
probabilistic representation of Vx.
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Proposition 3.5. For any (x, i) ∈ O set
(3.15) Ψx,i(τ, θ) := E
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρtX1,i,0t h
′(xX1,i,0t )dt+ c2e−ρτX1,i,0τ 1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρθX1,i,0θ 1{θ<τ}],
for a couple of F-stopping times (τ, θ). Then,
(3.16) Vx(x, i) = v(x, i), (x, i) ∈ O,
where v is the value function of the zero-sum Dynkin game with regime switching
(3.17) v(x, i) := sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ψx,i(τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ψx,i(τ, θ), (x, i) ∈ O.
Proof. For any (x, i) ∈ O, t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ Ω, recall (2.2) and set
(3.18) H(ω, t, x) := e−ρth
(
x ·X1,i,0t (ω)
)
, νt(ω) := c1e
−ρtX1,i,0t (ω), γt(ω) := −c2e−ρtX1,i,0t (ω).
Due to Assumptions 3.2 and 2.3, and standard estimates, it is easy to check that
(3.19) (i) E
[
sup
t≥0
|γt|+ sup
t≥0
|νt|
]
<∞, (ii) E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Hx(ω, t, x)|dt
]
<∞.
We thus have that the integrability conditions required in equation (2.4) of [20] are satisfied, and we
can therefore apply Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20] together with our Theorem 3.4 in order to conclude.
In fact, going through the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20], one should notice that the required
nonnegativity of the process γ is not necessary. The arguments of those proofs still work in the case (as
in the present paper) in which γ is negative (cf. (3.18)) and E
[
supt≥0 |γt|
]
<∞. 
4. The Associated Optimal Stopping Game
In this section we will study the Dynkin game with regime switching with value (3.17). In particular,
we will characterise the saddle point of the game as a couple of hitting times of two regime-dependent
boundaries, and we will prove global C1-regularity of v(·, i) for any i ∈ M. This study will be crucial
for the identification of the optimal control of problem (2.7), completely characterising the optimal debt
management policy of the government, developed in Section 5.
For the subsequent analysis, we define the process
(4.1) ρ̂t := (ρ− r + g)t−
∫ t
0
λYsds, t ≥ 0,
and let P̂ be the measure on (Ω,F) such that
(4.2)
dP̂
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= Mt , for t ≥ 0, with Mt := exp
{
− 1
2
σ2t+ σWt
}
,
and denote by Ê(x,i) the expectation under P̂ conditioned on X0 = x and Y0 = i, for (x, i) ∈ O. Notice
that for any t ≥ 0, we can rewrite Xx,i,0 from (2.2) as
(4.3) X1,i,0t = exp
{
(r − g)t+
∫ t
0
λY is ds
}
Mt = exp
{
ρt− ρ̂t
}
Mt.
In view of the change of measure in (4.2), we have by Girsanov’s theorem that Ŵt := Wt−σt is a standard
F-Brownian motion under P̂, and we introduce the process (cf. (2.2))
(4.4) X̂x,i,0t = xe
(r−g+ 1
2
σ2)t+
∫ t
0 λY is
ds+σŴt , t ≥ 0.
Moreover, we can rewrite (cf. (3.17))
(4.5) v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ), (x, i) ∈ O,
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where for every couple of F-stopping times (τ, θ) we have set
(4.6) Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ) := Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂th′
(
X̂0t
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
.
with ρ̂· given by (4.1).
It is easy to see that since ρ > r − g + λ1 by Assumption 3.2, then limt↑∞ e−ρ̂t = 0, P̂-a.s.. Therefore,
in the rest of this section, for any F-stopping time ζ we will adopt the convention
e−ρ̂ζ := 0 on {ζ = +∞}.
From (4.5)–(4.6) it is readily seen that c2 ≤ v(x, i) ≤ c1. Using the general theory of optimal stopping
for Markov processes (see, e.g., Chapter 2 of [23]) define the continuation region
C := {(x, i) ∈ O : c2 < v(x, i) < c1},
and the stopping regions
S1 := {(x, i) ∈ O : v(x, i) ≥ c1}, and S2 := {(x, i) ∈ O : v(x, i) ≤ c2}.
Here C is the region in which no player has an incentive to stop the evolution of the process (X̂0, Y ),
whereas Sj , j = 1, 2, is the region in which it is optimal for player j to stop.
Since x 7→ X̂x,i,0t is P̂-a.s. increasing (cf. (4.4)), it follows from (4.5) that x 7→ v(x, i) is increasing for
any i ∈M due to the convexity of h. Hence we can introduce the free boundaries
(4.7) a(i) := inf{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i) > c2} and b(i) := sup{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i) < c1},
(with the usual convention sup ∅ = 0 and inf ∅ = +∞), and we have that O = R+ ×M is split into
continuation and stopping regions completely determined by a and b; that is,
C = {(x, i) ∈ O : a(i) < x < b(i)}, S1 = {(x, i) ∈ O : x ≥ b(i)}, S2 = {(x, i) ∈ O : x ≤ a(i)}.
The Markov process (X̂0, Y ) has ca`dla`g paths and it is of Feller type by [29] (see Lemma 3.6 and
Theorem 3.10 therein). Hence its paths are right-continuous and quasi-left-continuous (i.e. left-continuous
over predictable stopping times), and by Theorem 2.1 of [13] we know that P̂(x,i)-a.s., for any (x, i) ∈ O,
the two stopping times
(4.8) θ? := inf{t ≥ 0 : (X̂0t , Yt) ∈ S1} and τ? := inf{t ≥ 0 : (X̂0t , Yt) ∈ S2},
form a saddle point for the game (4.5) (here the usual convention inf ∅ = +∞ applies). Moreover, by
easily adapting the results of Theorem 2.1 in [24] to our case with running cost h′, we also have the
following probabilistic characterisation of v. Such a result is usually referred to as the semi-harmonic
characterisation of v.
Proposition 4.1. For any (x, i) ∈ O, we have under P̂(x,i) that
(i)
( ∫ t∧τ?
0 e
−ρ̂sh′
(
X̂0s
)
ds+ e−ρ̂t∧τ?v(X̂0t∧τ? , Yt∧τ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-submartingale;
(ii)
( ∫ t∧θ?
0 e
−ρ̂sh′
(
X̂0s
)
ds+ e−ρ̂t∧θ?v(X̂0t∧θ? , Yt∧θ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-supermartingale;
(iii)
( ∫ t∧θ?∧τ?
0 e
−ρ̂sh′
(
X̂0s
)
ds+ e−ρ̂t∧θ?∧τ?v(X̂0t∧θ?∧τ? , Yt∧θ?∧τ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-martingale;
The following proposition rules out the possibility that the stopping regions are empty, thus the bound-
aries a(i) and b(i) from (4.7) exist and are finite under any regime i ∈M, and the optimal stopping times
in (4.8), forming the Nash-equilibrium, are well-defined.
Proposition 4.2. The following hold true:
(i) S1 6= ∅ and S2 6= ∅;
(ii) there exist constants 0 < a1 < b1 < +∞ and 0 < aN < bN < +∞, with a1 ≤ aN and b1 ≤ bN ,
such that for all i ∈M we have a1 ≤ a(i) ≤ aN and b1 ≤ b(i) ≤ bN .
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Proof. We prove the two claims separately.
Proof of (i). We argue by contradiction and we suppose that S1 = ∅. This implies that θ? = +∞
P̂(x,i)-a.s. for any (x, i) ∈ O and therefore
c1 > v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ
0
e−ρ̂th′
(
X̂0t
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ
]
≥ Ê
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρ̂th′
(
x · X̂1,i,0t
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂T
]
,
for T > 0 deterministic. By letting x ↑ ∞, and recalling that h′(x) ↑ ∞ by Assumption 2.3, we obtain
by the monotone convergence theorem that the last expected value diverges to +∞, thus leading to a
contradiction.
Given that we allow the process X̂0 to start from x = 0 at time t = 0, in which case X̂0t ≡ 0 for all
t ≥ 0, P̂-a.s., and h′(0) = 0 by Assumption 2.3-(ii), we clearly have that v(0, i) = c2 for any i ∈M. That
is, the minimiser chooses θ? = +∞ and the maximiser τ? = 0 in (4.8). Thus, (0, i) ∈ S2 for any i ∈ M,
which yields that the stopping set S2 6= ∅.
Proof of (ii). Since λYt ∈ [λN , λ1] P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 (see Assumption 2.1), it is straightforward to see
that vN (x) ≤ v(x, i) ≤ v1(x), for all x ≥ 0, i ∈M. The bounds vk(x), for k ∈ {1, N}, are defined by
vk(x) := sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ξ(k)x (τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ξ(k)x (τ, θ),(4.9)
with
Ξ(k)x (τ, θ) := Ê
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−(ρ−r−λk+g)th′
(
Z
(k),x
t
)
dt+ c2e
−(ρ−r−λk+g)τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−(ρ−r−λk+g)θ1{θ<τ}
]
for Z
(k),x
t = x exp{(r − g + 12σ2 + λk)t + σŴt}, for all t ≥ 0. By defining the free boundaries of the
one-dimensional (without regime-switching) zero-sum optimal stopping games (4.9), for any k ∈ {1, N},
by
ak := inf{x ≥ 0 : vk(x) > c2} and bk := sup{x ≥ 0 : vk(x) < c1},
we apply standard means to prove that these constants exist and are such that 0 < ak < bk < +∞
(compare also with our analysis of Section 6.3). Moreover, a1 ≤ aN and b1 ≤ bN . Thus, using the fact
that vN (x) ≤ v(x, i) ≤ v1(x), it is easy to see that a1 ≤ a(i) ≤ aN and b1 ≤ b(i) ≤ bN , which completes
the proof. 
For any i ∈M introduce the i-sections for C, S1 and S1 as
Ci := {x ≥ 0 : (x, i) ∈ C} and Sij := {x ≥ 0 : (x, i) ∈ Sj}, for j = 1, 2.
The next result proves regularity of x 7→ v(x, i) for any i ∈M.
Theorem 4.3. For any i ∈M,
(i) v(·, i) ∈ C2((Ci ∪ Si1 ∪ Si2) \ {a(i), b(i)});
(ii) v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+).
Proof. We prove the two parts separately.
Proof of (i). Clearly, for any i ∈ M, v(·, i) ∈ C2(Si1 ∪ Si2) \ {a(i), b(i)} since v ≡ c1 in Si1 \ {b(i)} and
v ≡ c2 in Si2 \ {a(i)}. Thus, what remains to be proved is that v(·, i) ∈ C2(Ci), which is presented below.
Let i ∈ M be given and fixed, and let α < β such that [α, β] ⊂ Ci = {x ≥ 0 : a(i) < x < b(i)}. Then,
setting f(x, i) := h′(x) +
∑
j 6=i qijv(x, j), for any x ∈ (α, β), consider a function w(·, i) : R+ 7→ R that
solves the ordinary differential equation
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i)−
(
ρ− (r − g + λi)− qii
)
w(x, i) = −f(x, i),(4.10)
with boundary conditions w(α, i) = v(α, i) and w(β, i) = v(β, i). Since x ≥ α > a(i) > 0, the differential
operator in (4.10) is uniformly elliptic and the solution w of the above Dirichlet problem is unique and is
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such that w(·, i) ∈ C2((α, β)). Then, using this function w and recalling that i ∈ M is given and fixed,
define the function w : (α, β)×M 7→ R as follows:
(4.11) w(x, j) :=
{
w(x, i) if j = i
v(x, j) if j 6= i.
In addition, for x ∈ (α, β), let τα,β := inf{t ≥ 0 : X̂x,i,0t /∈ (α, β)}, τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y it 6= i}, and set
ζ := τα,β ∧ τ1. Given that Yt = i for all t < ζ, Dynkin’s formula yields that
(4.12) w(x, i) = w(x, i) = Ê(x,i)
[
e−ρ̂ζv(X̂0ζ , Yζ) +
∫ ζ
0
e−ρ̂th′(X̂0t )dt
]
,
due to (4.11), which implies that w(X̂0ζ , Yζ) = v(X̂
0
ζ , Yζ), and (4.10), which implies that
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i)−
(
ρ− (r − g + λi)
)
w(x, i)
+
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
w(x, j)− w(x, i)] + h′(x)
=
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i) −
(
ρ − (r − g + λi) − qii
)
w(x, i) + f(x, i) = 0.
However, since [α, β] ⊂ Ci, we have ζ ≤ τ? ∧ θ?, hence it follows from Proposition 4.1-(iii), that the
right-hand side of (4.12) is equal to v(x, i). Therefore, w ≡ v in (α, β) ×M by the arbitrariness of i.
Also, by the arbitrariness of (α, β), we conclude that w = v in C, hence v(·, i) ∈ C2(Ci) for any i ∈M.
Proof of (ii). We first prove that v(·, i) ∈ C0(R+) for any i ∈ M. Since x 7→ v(x, i) is increasing, we
get for any arbitrary ε ∈ (0, 1) and (x, i) ∈ O that
0 ≤ v(x+ ε, i)− v(x, i) ≤ Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
∣∣h′((x+ ε) · X̂1,i,0t )− h′(x · X̂1,i,0t )∣∣dt].(4.13)
Since |h′((x+ε)·X̂1,i,0t )−h′(x·X̂1,i,0t )| ≤ 2h′((x+1)·X̂1,i,0t ), P̂-a.s. and Ê[
∫∞
0 e
−ρ̂th′
(
(x+1)·X̂1,i,0t
)
dt] <∞
due to Assumptions 2.3-(iii) and 3.2, we can take limits as ε ↓ 0 and invoke the dominated convergence
theorem in (4.13) to obtain the claimed continuity of v(·, i) for any i ∈M.
In view of the result in part (i) and of the continuity of v proved above, it suffices to show that vx(·, i)
is continuous across the free boundaries a(i) and b(i), for any i ∈ M. We provide details only for the
continuity of vx(x, i) at x = a(i). Similar arguments apply to show also the continuity of vx(x, i) at
x = b(i).
Take again an arbitrary (x, i) ∈ C, set θ? := θ?(x, i) = inf{t ≥ 0 : X̂x,i,0t ≥ b(Y it )} and for a sufficiently
small ε > 0, set τ?ε := τ
?(x + ε, i) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx+ε,i,0t ≤ a(Y it )}. Then, recalling that x 7→ v(x, i) is
increasing, we can write by Assumption 2.3-(iii)
0 ≤ v(x+ ε, i)− v(x, i)
ε
≤ 1
ε
Ê
[ ∫ τ?ε ∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂t
∣∣∣hx((x+ ε) · X̂1,i,0t )− hx(x · X̂1,i,0t )∣∣∣dt]
≤ K3 Ê
[ ∫ τ?ε ∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂tX̂1,i,0t
[
1 +
(
X̂x+ε,i,0t
)(m−2)+]
dt
]
.
Letting ε ↓ 0, noticing that τ?ε → τ?, P̂-a.s., and invoking the dominated convergence theorem thanks to
Assumption 3.2 yields
0 ≤ vx(x, i) ≤ K3 Ê
[ ∫ τ?∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂tX̂1,i,0t
[
1 + x(m−2)
+ · (X̂1,i,0t )(m−2)+]dt].
Then by taking limits as x ↓ a(i) in the latter expression we obtain vx(a(i)+, i) = 0. Given that v(x, i) = c2
for all x ≤ a(i) we conclude that vx(·, i) is continuous at x = a(i). 
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Denote by L the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process (X̂0, Y ) as the second-order differential
operator, acting for any i ∈M on functions u(·, i) ∈ C2(R), given by
Lu(x, i) := 1
2
σ2x2uxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xux(x, i) +
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
u(x, j)− u(x, i)].
Then, from standard arguments based on the strong Markov property, and from Proposition 4.1, Proposi-
tion 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, it follows that for any i ∈M, the triplet (v(·, i), a(i), b(i)) satisfies the following
free-boundary problem(L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) = −h′(x), a(i) < x < b(i),(4.14) (L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) ≤ −h′(x), x < b(i),(4.15) (L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) ≥ −h′(x), x > a(i),(4.16)
v(x, i) = c2, x ≤ a(i),(4.17)
v(x, i) = c1, x ≥ b(i).(4.18)
Moreover, v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+) for any i ∈M and vxx(·, i) ∈ L∞loc(R+) for any i ∈M.
The next proposition determines the geometry of the state space, and in particular the ordering of the
boundaries a and b across the different states of the economy.
Proposition 4.4. The following hold true:
(i) a(N) ≥ a(N − 1) ≥ · · · ≥ a(1) and b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(N);
(ii) a(N) < b(1).
Proof. We prove the two parts separately.
Proof of (i). From (4.5) it is easily seen that v(x, 1) ≥ v(x, 2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(x,N) since λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN .
This in particular implies that {x ≥ 0 : v(x,N) > c2} ⊆ · · · ⊆ {x ≥ 0 : v(x, 2) > c2} ⊆ {x ≥ 0 : v(x, 1) >
c2} and therefore, in view of (4.7), we know that a(N) ≥ a(N − 1) ≥ · · · ≥ a(1).
Analogous arguments show that b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(N).
Proof of (ii). We argue by contradiction and we suppose that b(1) < a(N).
On one hand, any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) is such that x > b(1) > a(1) and v(x, 1) = c1 (cf. (4.7)). Therefore
(4.16) and (4.18) yield
(4.19) − (ρ− µ1)c1 +∑
j 6=1
q1jv(x, j) + q11c1 + h
′(x) ≥ 0,
where we used the equality
∑
j 6=1 q1j = −q11 and set µ1 := r + λ1 − g.
On the other hand, we also have that, any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) is such that x < a(N) < b(N) and
v(x,N) = c2 (cf. (4.7)). Hence, (4.15) and (4.17) give
(4.20) − (ρ− µN)c2 + ∑
j 6=N
qNjv(x, j) + qNNc2 + h
′(x) ≤ 0,
where we used the equality
∑
j 6=N qNj = −qNN and set µN := r + λN − g.
In all, it follows from (4.19)–(4.20) that, for any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)),
FN (x) := −
(
ρ− µN
)
c2 +
∑
j 6=N
qNjv(x, j) + qNNc2 + h
′(x)
≤ 0 ≤ −(ρ− µ1)c1 +∑
j 6=1
q1jv(x, j) + q11c1 + h
′(x) =: G1(x).(4.21)
Notice now that, by taking into account the inequalities c2 ≤ v(x, j) ≤ c1 for any (x, j) ∈ O, together
with Assumption 2.5, we obtain for any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) that
G1(x) ≤ −
(
ρ− µ1
)
c1 + h
′(x) < −(ρ− µN)c2 + h′(x) ≤ FN (x),
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which in view of (4.21) leads to a contradiction. 
Remark 4.5. Proposition 4.4 has the important consequence of characterising the geometry of continua-
tion and stopping regions. This fact, combined with Theorem 4.3, provides an operative method to deter-
mine the free boundaries a(i) and b(i), i ∈M. Indeed, since for any i ∈M we have that v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+),
then the value function must be necessarily continuously differentiable at the free boundaries a(j) and b(j)
for all j ∈ M. This yields the following system of nonlinear equations for the 2N -dimensional vector
(a(1), b(1), . . . , a(N), b(N)):
v(a(i)+, i) = c2 and vx(a(i)+, i) = 0, ∀ i ∈M(4.22)
v(b(i)−, i) = c1 and vx(b(i)−, i) = 0, , ∀ i ∈M(4.23)
v(a(j)−, i) = v(a(j)+, i) and vx(a(j)−, i) = vx(a(j)+, i), ∀ (i, j) ∈M2 : j > i,(4.24)
v(b(j)−, i) = v(b(j)+, i) and vx(b(j)−, i) = vx(b(j)+, i), ∀ (i, j) ∈M2 : j < i.(4.25)
We will see how to explicitly write the system of equations for the boundaries in the last section of this
paper, where we study the specific case in which the Markov chain Y has N = 2 states.
5. The Optimal Debt Management Rule
Combining Theorem 4.3 with Proposition 3.5 we immediately have for any i ∈ M, that V (·, i) ∈
C2(R+). Hence by the Dynamic Programming Principle (see, e.g., [14], Chapter VIII.5; see also [3], in
particular Remarks 3.10 and 3.11, for a proof in a very general setting)
V (x, i) = inf
ϕ∈A
E(x,i)
[
e−ρτV (Xϕτ , Yτ ) +
∫ τ
0
e−ρth(Xϕt )dt+
∫ τ
0
e−ρt
(
c1dηt − c2dξt
)]
,
for any F-stopping time τ , V identifies with a classical solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation
(5.1) min
{(G − ρ)V (x, i) + h(x),−c2 + Vx(x, i), c1 − Vx(x, i)} = 0, (x, i) ∈ O.
Here G is the infinitesimal generator of (X0, Y ), which acts on functions f : O → R with f(·, i) ∈ C2(R)
for any given and fixed i ∈M as
(5.2) Gf(x, i) := 1
2
σ2x2fxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi)xfx(x, i)− ρf(x, i) +
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
f(x, j)− f(x, i)].
It is worth noting that, due to (5.2), equation (5.1) is actually a system of variational inequalities, coupled
through the transition rates qij .
In what follows, we will use the optimal boundaries a(·) and b(·) of (4.7), which define the value function
of the associated optimal stopping game in (3.17) (equivalently, (4.5)), in order to construct the optimal
debt ratio management policy for the original problem (2.7).
To that end, recall the boundaries a(·) and b(·) of (4.7) and let x ∈ [a(i), b(i)], i ∈ M. Then, consider
the two-sided Skorokhod reflection problem SP(a, b;x, i) defined as:
Find (ξ, η) ∈ U × U s.t.

Xx,i,ϕt ∈ [a(Yt), b(Yt)], P-a.s. for a.e. t > 0,∫ T
0
1{Xx,i,ϕt >a(Yt)}dξt = 0, P-a.s. for any T > 0,∫ T
0
1{Xx,i,ϕt <b(Yt)}dηt = 0, P-a.s. for any T > 0,
(SP(a, b;x, i))
where we have set ϕ := ξ− η. Such a problem admits a unique solution (ξ̂, η̂) (see, e.g., Corollary 2.4 and
Theorem 2.6 in [4]), and we denote ϕ̂ := ξ̂ − η̂. This solution is such that supp{dξ̂t} ∩ supp{dη̂t} = ∅,
since a(i) < b(i) for any i ∈M (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.4).
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Then, for any (x, i) ∈ O define the control (here and in the rest of the paper, ( · )+ denotes the positive
part)
(5.3)
{
ϕ? := ξ? − η? such that ξ?0 = 0 = η?0, P− a.s., where for any t > 0,
ξ?t := (a(i)− x)+ + ξ̂t and η?t := (x− b(i))+ + η̂t.
The remaining of this section is dedicated to proving the optimality of the control (5.3) for the original
debt ratio management problem (2.7).
Before doing so, it is worth noticing that the debt ratio management policy prescribed by the controls
in (5.3) involves two types of actions by the government:
(a) Small-scale actions employed when the debt ratio Xt approaches, at any time t ≥ 0, either boundary
a(Yt) from above or boundary b(Yt) from below. The purpose of these measures is to make sure (with
a minimal effort) that the debt ratio level Xt is kept inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)]. Mathematically,
these are the actions caused by the continuous parts ξ̂cont and η̂cont of the controls ξ̂ and η̂, respectively
(Skorokhod reflection-type policies);
(b) Large-scale actions employed when the debt ratio Xt, at any time t ≥ 0, is either below the boundary
a(Yt) or above the boundary b(Yt). The purpose of these measures is to bring immediately the debt ratio
level Xt back inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)]. Mathematically, these are the actions caused at time t = 0,
by the initial jumps (a(i)− x)+ and (x− b(i))+, or at any time t > 0, by the jump parts ∆ξ̂t := ξ̂t+ − ξ̂t
and ∆η̂t := η̂t+ − η̂t of the controls ξ̂ and η̂, respectively (Lump-sum-type policies).
Remark 5.1. Note that, the large-scale actions mentioned in (b) above, caused by the jump parts ∆ξ̂t and
∆η̂t of the controls for t > 0, will only be needed at times of jumps of the macroeconomic regime-switching
process Yt. These are the only times when the debt ratio level Xt may exit the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)].
This is an interesting feature, coming from the inclusion of regime-switching macroeconomic factors in
the model, not usually observed in bounded-variation stochastic control problems without regime-switching,
where a lump-sum action may be required only at time t = 0 (see, e.g., [16], among others).
In order to illustrate the argument in Remark 5.1, consider the following example. Suppose that time
T is a jump time from the initial economic regime YT− = i to a “worse” one YT = j. Suppose also that,
immediately before the jump, the debt ratio was inside the required bounds (i.e. a(i) < XT− < b(i)), but
after the jump it ends up above the new upper bound under the new regime j (i.e. a(j) < b(j) < XT ).
In this case, the optimal debt ratio management policy of the government, which was before the regime
change “just observing” (no-action), will now require a lump-sum type of austerity policy, e.g. with a
large-scale spending cut, that can decrease the debt ratio level by ∆ξ̂T = XT − b(j).
We now proceed with the next lemma showing the admissibility of the control ϕ? in (5.3).
Lemma 5.2. For any (x, i) ∈ O, we have ϕ? ∈ A(x, i).
Proof. Clearly ϕ? ∈ V. Also, for any (x, i) ∈ O, we have Xx,i,ϕ?t ≥ 0, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 since b(i) >
a(i) > 0. It thus remains only to show that
(5.4) E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dξ?t + dη
?
t
)]
<∞.
Notice that (5.3) yields
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dξ?t + dη
?
t
)]
= (a(i)− x)+ + (x− b(i))+ + E(z(x,i),i)
[ ∫ ∞
0+
e−ρt
(
dξ̂t + dη̂t
)]
,
where z(x, i) = x if x ∈ (a(i), b(i)), z(x, i) = a(i) if x ≤ a(i) and z(x, i) = b(i) if x ≥ b(i). Hence, to have
(5.4) it suffices to prove that
E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dξ̂t + dη̂t
)]
<∞,
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for any z ∈ [a(i), b(i)]. In the following we only prove that
(5.5) E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξ̂t
]
<∞, (z, i) ∈ [a(i), b(i)]×M,
since analogous arguments can be employed to show that E(z,i)[
∫∞
0 e
−ρtdη̂t] <∞.
To prove (5.5) we adapt arguments from [26]. Let X̂ := X ϕ̂ and g : R×M→ R be any solution to(G − ρ)g(x, i) = 0.
Then, take a fixed T > 0 and let 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < ... < TM < T be the random times of jumps of Y in the
interval [0, T ) (clearly, the number M of those jumps is random as well). Notice that the times Tn, for
n = 1, . . . ,M , of regime changes are the only possible jump times of ϕ̂, as discussed in Remark 5.1.
By the regularity of g we can apply Itoˆ-Meyer’s formula for semimartingales ([21], pp. 278–301) to
the process (e−ρtg(X̂t, Yt))t≥0 on each of the intervals [0, T1), (T1, T2),...,(TM , T ). Piecing together all the
terms as in the proof of Lemma 3 at p. 104 of [27], we obtain
E(z,i)
[
e−ρT g(X̂T , YT )
]
− g(z, i) = E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρtgx(X̂t, Yt)dξ̂contt
]
(5.6)
− E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρtgx(X̂t, Yt)dη̂contt
]
+ E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn<T
e−ρs
(
g(X̂Tn+, YTn)− g(X̂Tn , YTn)
)]
.
Observe that, the latter expectation in (5.6) can be written as
E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn<T
e−ρs
(
g(X̂Tn+, YTn)− g(X̂Tn , YTn)
)]
= E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn<T
e−ρs
(
1{∆ξ̂Tn>0} + 1{∆η̂Tn>0}
)(
g(X̂Tn+, YTn)− g(X̂Tn , YTn)
)]
(5.7)
= E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn<T
e−ρs
(∫ ∆ξ̂Tn
0
gx(X̂Tn + u, YTn)du−
∫ ∆η̂Tn
0
gx(X̂Tn − u, YTn)du
)]
.
Impose now that gx(a(i), i) = −1 and gx(b(i), i) = 0, and extend the function g on (−∞, a(i))∪(b(i),∞)
so that gx(x, i) = −1 for any x < a(i) and gx(x, i) = 0 for any x > b(i) (for example, set g(x, i) := a(i)−
x+g(a(i), i) for x < a(i) and g(x, i) = g(b(i), i) for x > b(i)). Then, since ξ̂· is flat off {t ≥ 0 : X̂t ≤ a(Yt)}
and η̂· is flat off {t ≥ 0 : X̂t ≥ b(Yt)} (cf. Problem SP(a, b; z, i)), we get{
gx(X̂t, Yt)dξ̂
cont
t = −dξ̂contt and gx(X̂t, Yt)dη̂contt = 0,∫ ∆ξ̂Tn
0 gx(X̂Tn + u, YTn)du = −∆ξ̂Tn and
∫ ∆η̂Tn
0 gx(X̂Tn − u, YTn)du = 0.
(5.8)
Therefore, by substituting (5.8) in (5.7) and then (5.6), we get that
(5.9) E(z,i)
[
e−ρT g(X̂T , YT )
]
− g(z, i) = −E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρtdξ̂t
]
.
Finally, given that g(X̂T , YT ) ≤ maxi∈M supx∈[a(1),b(N)] g(x, i), P(x,i)-a.s. (cf. Proposition 4.4), we can
let T ↑ ∞, and apply the dominated convergence theorem on the left-hand side of (5.9) and the monotone
convergence theorem on its right-hand side, to obtain
g(z, i) = E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξ̂t
]
.
The finiteness of the function g constructed above, yields (5.5). 
Thanks to the admissibility of ϕ? we can now prove its optimality.
Theorem 5.3. The admissible ϕ? = ξ? − η? of (5.3) is optimal for the problem (2.7).
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Proof. It suffices to show that J(x,i)(ϕ?) = V (x, i) for any (x, i) ∈ O. In order to simplify notation from
now on we write X? ≡ Xϕ? , P(x,i)-a.s.
Fix (x, i) ∈ O, and take arbitrary T > 0. Let 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < ... < TM < T be the random times
of jumps of Y in the interval [0, T ) (clearly, the number M of those jumps is random as well). By the
regularity of V we can apply Itoˆ-Meyer’s formula to the process (e−ρtV (X?t , Yt))t≥0 (see also proof of
Lemma 5.2), and taking expectations we get
V (x, i) = E(x,i)
[
e−ρ TV (X?T , YT )−
∫ T
0
e−ρs(G − ρ)V (X?s , Ys)ds
]
(5.10)
−E(x,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρsVx(X?s , Ys)
(
dξ?,conts − dη?,conts
)]
− E(x,i)
[ ∑
0≤s<T
e−ρs
(
V (X?s+, Ys)− V (X?s , Ys)
) ]
,
where we used the facts that the expectation of the stochastic integral vanishes since X?t ∈ [a(1), b(N)]
(cf. Proposition 4.4) and Vx(·, i) is continuous.
Recall now that V solves (5.1) and Vx = v by (3.16), with v as in (3.17). Hence, sinceX
?
s ∈ [a(Ys), b(Ys)],
P(x,i)-a.s. for a.e. s > 0, we have that (G − ρ)V (X?s , Ys) = −h(X?s ) P(x,i)-a.s. for a.e. s ≥ 0. Furthermore,
notice that (ξ?, η?) solve the Skorokhod reflection problem, and therefore {t : dξ?t (ω) > 0} ⊆ {t : X?t (ω) ≤
a(Yt(ω))} and {t : dη?t (ω) > 0} ⊆ {t : X?t (ω) ≥ b(Yt(ω))} for any ω ∈ Ω. Then, because Vx(x, i) = c2 for
x ≤ a(i) and Vx(x, i) = c1 for x ≥ b(i), we obtain from (5.10) (see also (5.7)) that
V (x, i) =E(x,i)
[
e−ρ TV (X?T , YT )
]
+ E(x,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρsh(X?s )ds+
∫ T
0
e−ρs
(
c1dη
?
s − c2dξ?s
)]
.(5.11)
Since X?t ∈ [a(1), b(N)] (cf. Proposition 4.4) and V (·, i) is continuous, applying the dominated con-
vergence theorem gives limT↑∞ E(x,i)[e−ρ TV (X?T , YT )] = 0. Hence, taking limits as T →∞ in the second
expectation on the right-hand side of (5.11), and invoking the monotone convergence theorem, together
with Lemma 5.2 and (2.6), we find
V (x, i) =E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρsh(X?s )ds+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
c1dη
?
s − c2dξ?s
)] ≡ J(x,i)(ϕ?).
The latter shows optimality of ϕ? = ξ? − η? and thus completes the proof. 
Remark 5.4. Notice that the unique optimal debt ratio management policy ϕ? from (5.3) is also optimal
in the larger class of admissible controls
{
ϕ ∈ V : E[∫∞0 e−ρt(dηt + dξt)] < ∞}, when we allow for X to
become negative. In this paper we have however formulated the optimal debt management problem over
the more economically relevant class A.
6. Explicit Solution in a Case Study with Two Regimes
In this section, we consider the simplest possible regime-switching model of debt ratio management.
In particular, the continuous-time Markov chain Y , modelling the macroeconomic conditions affecting
the interest rate on debt, has only N = 2 states; namely, Yt ∈ M := {1, 2}. In view of Assumption
2.1, we have λ1 > λ2. Therefore, the states 1 and 2 represent the “bad” and “good” scenarios for the
government, under which the interest on debt is “high” and “low”, respectively. We further assume a
quadratic running cost function h(x) = x2/2 for all x > 0, which satisfies Assumption 2.3-(i)–(iv); e.g.
set m = 2 and K1 = K2 = K3 = 1 in Assumption 2.3-(iii).
Thanks to 3.5, the government which originally aims at solving (2.7), given by
V (x, i) := inf
ϕ∈A
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
2
(
Xϕt
)2
dt+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξt
]
, (x, i) ∈ R+ × {1, 2},
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can first find the value v(x, i) of the optimal stopping game (3.17) with (3.15) and O ≡ R+ × {1, 2}. In
view of (4.5)–(4.6), v(x, i) can be rewritten as
v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂tX̂0t dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
= inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂tX̂0t dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
,(6.1)
for all (x, i) ∈ O and ρ̂· given by (4.1). Then, the original value V will follow from the equation (3.16)
and the optimal debt ratio management policy given by (5.3) will involve the boundaries a(1) ≤ a(2) <
b(1) ≤ b(2) (cf. Proposition 4.4) that we obtain by solving (6.1).
6.1. Derivation of the Explicit Solution. In the following we write q1 := q12 = −q11 and q2 := q21 =
−q22. Equation (4.14), used to obtain the value function v(x, i) of the optimal stopping game, consists of
the following couple of ordinary differential equations
1
2
σ2x2vxx(x, 1) + (r − g + λ1 + σ2)xvx(x, 1)− (ρ− r + g − λ1)v(x, 1) + q1
(
v(x, 2)− v(x, 1)) = −x
1
2
σ2x2vxx(x, 2) + (r − g + λ2 + σ2)xvx(x, 2)− (ρ− r + g − λ2)v(x, 2) + q2
(
v(x, 1)− v(x, 2)) = −x
for all a(1) < x < b(1) and a(2) < x < b(2), respectively, while the value function should also satisfy the
four conditions in (4.22)–(4.25) at the boundaries a(i) and b(i), for i = 1, 2 (see also Remark 4.5 for more
details).
Solving the system of ordinary differential equations we get that
v(x, 1) =

c2 , if x ≤ a(1),
A1x
α1 +A2x
α2 + 1
ρ+q1−2(r−g+λ1)−σ2x+
c2q1
ρ+q1−(r−g+λ1) , if a(1) < x ≤ a(2),
B1x
β1 +B2x
β2 +B3x
β3 +B4x
β4
+ ρ+q1+q2−2(r−g+λ2)−σ
2(
ρ+q1−2(r−g+λ1)−σ2
)(
ρ+q2−2(r−g+λ2)−σ2
)
−q1q2
x , if a(2) < x ≤ b(1),
c1 , if x ≥ b(1)
and
v(x, 2) =

c2 , if x ≤ a(2)
Φ1(β1)
q1
B1x
β1 + Φ1(β2)q1 B2x
β2 + Φ1(β3)q1 B3x
β3 + Φ1(β4)q1 B4x
β4
+ ρ+q1+q2−2(r−g+λ1)−σ
2(
ρ+q1−2(r−g+λ1)−σ2
)(
ρ+q2−2(r−g+λ2)−σ2
)
−q1q2
x , if a(2) < x ≤ b(1),
C1x
γ1 + C2x
γ2 + 1
ρ+q2−2(r−g+λ2)−σ2x+
c1q2
ρ+q2−(r−g+λ2) , if b(1) < x ≤ b(2),
c1 , if x ≥ b(2),
where the constants α2 < 0 < α1 (under Assumption 3.2 we have α1 > 1) are given by
α1,2 =
1
2
+
r − g + λ1
σ2
±
√(
1
2
+
r − g + λ1
σ2
)2
+
2
(
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)
)
σ2
,
the constants γ2 < 0 < γ1 (under Assumptions 2.1 and 3.2 we have γ1 > 1) are given by
γ1,2 =
1
2
+
r − g + λ2
σ2
±
√(
1
2
+
r − g + λ2
σ2
)2
+
2
(
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)
)
σ2
,
and the constants β4 < β3 < 0 < β2 < β1 are the solutions of the characteristic equation Φ1(β) Φ2(β) =
q1 q2 with
Φi(β) =
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
r − g + λi + 1
2
σ2
)
β − (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi)), for i = 1, 2.
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Then, applying the conditions in (4.22) and (4.23) at the boundaries a(i) and b(i), for i = 1, 2, we
obtain the following expressions
Ai ≡ Ai
(
a(1)
)
=
(−1)i+1a−αi(1)
α1 − α2
[
α3−i − 1
ρ+ q1 − 2(r − g + λ1)− σ2 a(1)−
α3−ic2
(
ρ− (r − g + λ1)
)
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)
]
,(6.2)
Ci ≡ Ci
(
b(2)
)
=
(−1)i+1b−γi(2)
γ1 − γ2
[
γ3−i − 1
ρ+ q2 − 2(r − g + λ2)− σ2 b(2)−
γ3−ic1
(
ρ− (r − g + λ2)
)
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)
]
,(6.3)
for i = 1, 2, as well as
Bi ≡ Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
(6.4)
=
∑
j,k,l∈I\{i}:
l 6=j<k 6=l
(−1)k−j+1{l>i}(βj − βk)
[
Φ1(βj)Φ1(βk)
q21
fl,1
(
b(1)
)(a(2)
b(1)
)βj+βk
+ Φ1(βl)q1 fl,2
(
a(2)
)(a(2)
b(1)
)βl]
bβi(1)
∑
j,k,l∈I\{1}:
j 6=k<l 6=j
(−1)j+1(β1 − βj)(βk − βl)
[
Φ1(β1)Φ1(βj)
q21
(
a(2)
b(1)
)β1+βj
+ Φ1(βk)Φ1(βl)
q21
(
a(2)
b(1)
)βk+βl]
for i ∈ I := {1, 2, 3, 4} and
fm,n(x) =
(1− βm)
(
ρ+ q1 + q2 − 2(r − g + λ3−n)− σ2
)(
ρ+ q1 − 2(r − g + λ1)− σ2
)(
ρ+ q2 − 2(r − g + λ2)− σ2
)− q1q2 x+ βmcn
for m ∈ I and n = 1, 2. Notice that under Assumption 3.2 all the denominators in the formulas above
are nonzero.
We then apply (4.24)–(4.25) and we obtain
v(a(2)+, 1) = v(a(2)−, 1) & vx(a(2)+, 1) = vx(a(2)−, 1),
v(b(1)+, 2) = v(b(1)−, 2) & vx(b(1)+, 2) = vx(b(1)−, 2).
Using the above conditions for the expressions of v(x, i) for i = 1, 2 with Ai, Ci for i = 1, 2 and Bi for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 given by (6.2)–(6.4), we obtain the boundaries a(i) and b(i) for i = 1, 2 as the solution of the
following system of four arithmetic equations:
2∑
i=1
Ai
(
a(1)
)
aαi(2) =
4∑
i=1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
aβi(2) +
q1
(
f1,2
(
a(2)
)− β1c2)
(1− β1)(ρ+ q1 − 2(r − g + λ1)− σ2)(6.5)
− q1c2
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)
2∑
i=1
αiAi
(
a(1)
)
aαi(2) =
4∑
i=1
βiBi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
aβi(2) +
q1
(
f1,2
(
a(2)
)− β1c2)
(1− β1)(ρ+ q1 − 2(r − g + λ1)− σ2)(6.6)
2∑
i=1
Ci
(
b(2)
)
bγi(1) =
4∑
i=1
Φ1(βi)
q1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
bβi(1) +
q2
(
f1,1
(
b(1)
)− β1c1)
(1− β1)(ρ+ q2 − 2(r − g + λ2)− σ2)(6.7)
− q2c1
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)
2∑
i=1
γiCi
(
b(2)
)
bγi(1) =
4∑
i=1
βi
Φ1(βi)
q1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
bβi(1) +
q2
(
f1,1
(
b(1)
)− β1c1)
(1− β1)(ρ+ q2 − 2(r − g + λ2)− σ2)(6.8)
Finally, for any i = 1, 2, combining (4.15) with (4.17), and (4.16) with (4.18), we find that the bound-
aries a(1), a(2), b(1), b(2) must necessarily be such that
(6.9) x− (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi))c2 + qiv(x, j) ≤ 0, for j 6= i and x < a(i),
and
(6.10) x− (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi))c1 + qiv(x, j) ≥ 0, for j 6= i and x > b(i).
The above conditions have the practical use of providing bounds on a(1), a(2), b(1), b(2) that one has to
check on a case by case basis when trying to solve numerically (6.5)–(6.8).
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It is worth stressing that one advantage of our direct probabilistic method - compared to the traditional
analytic guess-and-verify one - is that existence of a solution to (6.5)–(6.8) satisfying (6.9)–(6.10) does not
have to be proved, since it follows directly from the general theory developed in Section 4, in particular
Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 4.4. Moreover, we also have uniqueness of such a solution. Indeed, if
there were another quadruple (â(1), â(2), b̂(1), b̂(2)) solving (6.5)–(6.8) and satisfying (6.9)–(6.10), by a
standard verification argument one could prove that the bounded variation control that keeps the process
(Xt, Yt) in the region {(x, i) ∈ O : â(i) ≤ x ≤ b̂(i)} for almost every t ≥ 0 (i.e. solving SP(â, b̂;x, i)) is
optimal. However, this would contradict the uniqueness of the optimal control proved in Theorem 3.4.
Remark 6.1. Here we comment on the structure of the value function in the general case of N ≥ 2
regimes.
In the above case study with N = 2 regimes, there are 4 boundaries a(i), b(i), i = 1, 2, solving uniquely
the system of 4 algebraic equations with constraints in (6.5)–(6.10), and the value function involves in
total 8 boundary-dependent-coefficients given by (6.2)–(6.4).
When solving the problem with N regimes, the expression of the value function in each of the subintervals
of the i-section of the continuation region Ci = {x ≥ 0 : a(i) < x < b(i)}, for any i ∈ M, will again
have two components. The first component is the particular solution to the coupled system of N ordinary
differential equations (cf. (4.14)), and it will always be a linear function with coefficients depending only
on the parameters of the problem. The second component is the general solution to the coupled system of
N ordinary differential equations, and it will be a polynomial with coefficients (in total the value function
will involve 2N2 such coefficients) depending on the 2N boundaries (in total) of the continuation region.
The latter boundaries will uniquely solve a system of 2N algebraic equations with constraints.
6.2. Comparative Statics Analysis. In this section we show how the optimal control boundaries
a(1), a(2), b(1), b(2), which define the government’s debt ratio management policy, depend on the rele-
vant model’s parameters, and we provide interpretations of the results. In what follows, whenever we
need to stress the dependence of the boundaries and value function on a given parameter χ, we will write
a(i;χ) and b(i;χ), as well as v(x, i;χ), x ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2.
Our analysis begins with a theoretical proof of the monotonicity of the control boundaries with respect
to r − g, and a numerical illustration in Figure 1. We then continue with a numerical study of the
sensitivity with respect to σ and q2 − q1. Due to the complexity of our problem, proving analytically
the monotonicity of a(i) and b(i), i = 1, 2, with respect to σ and q2 − q1 is far from trivial. However,
the explicit nature of our results (cf. the system of equations (6.5)–(6.8)) allows for an easy numerical
implementation resulting in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Comparative Statics with respect to r − g. We start with the following result.
Proposition 6.2. For any i ∈ {1, 2} we have that (r − g) 7→ a(i; r − g) and (r − g) 7→ b(i; r − g) are
decreasing.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be given and fixed. Remember that from (4.7) we can write
a(i; r − g) = inf{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i; r − g) > c2},
b(i; r − g) = sup{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i; r − g) < c1}.
From (6.1) it is easily seen that (r − g) 7→ v(x, i; r − g) is increasing. Hence, (4.7) imply that (r − g) 7→
a(i; r − g) and (r − g) 7→ b(i; r − g) are decreasing, and the claim thus follows. 
Remark 6.3. It is worth noticing that the proof of the previous result does not use the fact that the
continuous-time Markov chain Y has only two states. Therefore, Proposition 6.2 does hold in the more
general setting of N ≥ 2.
It is clear from (2.1) that the higher the real interest rate on debt (net of the GDP growth rate), the
more the country’s debt ratio increases in expectations. In such a case, the result of Proposition 6.2
implies that the government should adopt a more restrictive policy for the management of public debt,
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Figure 1. Monotonicity of the control boundaries for i = 1, 2 with respect to r − g. For
this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: q1 = 0.02, q2 = 0.02, λ1 = 0.1,
λ2 = 0, σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
in order to dam the resulting expected costs. In other words, as r − g increases, the critical level, below
which the government aims at keeping the debt ratio, decreases, so that the government should (optimally)
intervene sooner to reduce the debt ratio, through austerity policies in the form of spending cuts. On
the other hand, the trigger level at which the government starts increasing the debt ratio decreases as
well, meaning that the government should be willing to postpone its public investment intervention which
increases the debt ratio. (see Figure 1).
We can also observe from Figure 1 that when the interest rate on debt r is sufficiently higher that the
GDP growth rate g, then the debt ratio ceiling values b(1) and b(2) seem to come closer, thus implying
that the debt reduction policy is not strongly affected by the state of the economy. Similarly, the trigger
values a(1) and a(2) seem to converge to each other when the GDP grows at a much higher rate than
the interest on debt. Hence under such a high GDP growth, the government can adopt, independently of
the macroeconomic regime, a similar policy for public investments, aiming at increasing the debt ratio.
On the contrary, the trigger levels a(1) and a(2) (resp. b(1) and b(2)) take significantly different values
when g is sufficiently lower than r (resp. r is sufficiently lower than g), so that in this case the debt policy
seems to strongly react to the state of the economy.
Furthermore, under the choice of parameters of Figure 1, the levels b(i), i = 1, 2, that trigger the debt
reduction policies are on average equal to 60%, a value in line with the Maastricht Treaty’s reference value
of 1992.
Comparative Statics with respect to σ. We now move on to the study of the sensitivity of the control
boundaries with respect to the debt ratio’s volatility σ. We can observe from Figure 2 that, in both
regimes i = 1 and i = 2, the amplitude of continuation region b(i) − a(i) increases with σ. This result
is well known in the literature on real options (see [12], among others). In our setting of the debt ratio
management, this means that the more volatile the debt ratio, the more cautious the government is, hence
the longer it should wait before intervening on the debt ratio.
Comparative Statics with respect to q2− q1. It is seen in Figure 3 that, in both regimes i = 1 and i = 2,
the amplitude of the continuation region b(i)− a(i) decreases when q2 − q1 increases. In particular, this
can be viewed in two ways: On one hand, when the economy is in the “bad” state i = 1, a decreasing rate
q1 of moving to the “good” regime i = 2, suggests that the government should become more proactive,
adopt a more restrictive policy and be willing to intervene more frequently on the debt ratio. This will
counterbalance the fact that it is expected to remain under the “bad” regime for a longer time. On the
other hand, when the economy is in the “good” state i = 2, an increasing rate q2 of moving to the “bad”
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Figure 2. Monotonicity of the continuation (no-action) region’s size b(i)− a(i), i = 1, 2,
with respect to σ. For this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: q1 = 0.02,
q2 = 0.02, r = 0.04, g = 0.015, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
Figure 3. Monotonicity of the continuation region’s size, under both regimes, with respect
to q2−q1. For this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: r = 0.04, g = 0.015,
λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
regime i = 1, suggests that the government should again become more proactive by adopting a more
restrictive policy, so that it is more prepared to deal with the worse economic scenario.
6.3. Comparison with the no-regime-switching case. In this section, we first present the solution
to the no-regime-switching case, namely, the problem with only one regime N = 1. Then, we compare the
resulting optimal government policy with the regime-switching optimal policy from Section 6.2 (where
N = 2) and we comment on the results.
Observe that, under no regime-switching, the dynamics of the governmentally managed debt-to-GDP
ratio become one-dimensional and read as (compare with (2.3))
dX˜t =
(
r − g)X˜tdt+ σX˜tdWt + dξt − dηt, t > 0, X˜0 = x ∈ R+,
where we assume there is no additional macroeconomic risk process Y , in the form of a continuous-time
Markov chain, and the (constant) interest rate on debt is simply given by the parameter r. In this
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case, the debt ratio management problem (2.5)–(2.7) becomes one-dimensional as well, i.e. V (x, i) ≡
V (x). Moreover, the boundaries involved in the two-sided Skorokhod reflection problem SP(a, b;x, i) ≡
SP(a, b;x), defining the optimal controls in (5.3) and consequently the optimal policy of the government,
are also constants denoted by a and b.
It follows from standard theory on singular stochastic control problems (see Chapter VIII in [14];
compare also with the related problem in [16], among others) that the value function V of (2.7) with
h(x) = x2/2 in (2.5), satisfies the following ordinary differential equation with boundary conditions:
1
2
σ2x2Vxx(x) + (r − g)xVx(x)− ρV (x) = −1
2
x2 for a < x < b,
Vx(a+) = c2 and Vx(b−) = c1,
Vxx(a+) = 0 and Vxx(b−) = 0.
Solving the above free-boundary problem, and imposing continuity of V at x = a and x = b, we get
that
V (x) =

V (a)− c2 (a− x) , if x ≤ a,
D1x
δ1 +D2x
δ2 + 1
2(ρ−2(r−g)−σ2)x
2 , if a < x < b,
V (b) + c1 (x− b) , if x ≥ b,
with
Di ≡ Di(a, b) =
(
a− c2(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2)
)(
b
a
)δ3−i − (b− c1(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2))( ba)
(−1)i+1 δi (ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2) aδi−1
[(
b
a
)δ1 − ( ba)δ2] ,
where the constants δ2 < 0 < 1 < δ1 are given by
δ1,2 =
1
2
− r − g
σ2
±
√(
1
2
− r − g
σ2
)2
+
2ρ
σ2
.
and the optimal boundaries a ≤ c2(ρ− r + g) < c1(ρ− r + g) ≤ b are given by the unique solution to the
system of arithmetic equations
J1,2(a) = J1,1(b) and J2,2(a) = J2,1(b)
where
Ji,j(x) =
(δi − 2)x− cj(δi − 1)(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2)
xδ3−i−1
.
In order to compare the governmental optimal policy when there is no regime-switching with the case
study with N = 2 regimes, we numerically calculate the values of the boundaries a and b and compare with
the values of a(1), a(2), b(1) and b(2). Recall that, the no-regime-switching case assumes a constant interest
rate r. Thus, in order to facilitate the comparison, we assume that under the “good” macroeconomic
regime i = 2 in the two-regime case, we set λ2 = 0, so that it also corresponds to an interest rate on
debt equal to r. Then, under the “bad” macroeconomic regime i = 1, the interest rate on debt becomes
r + λ1 > r; see Table 1.
If there is a possibility for the government to experience different macroeconomic regimes, it is seen from
Table 1 that the government should become more proactive, by adopting a more restrictive debt reduction
policy. Even under the “good” macroeconomic regime i = 2, the government should (optimally) intervene
sooner through austerity policies to reduce the debt ratio (at 58.23%), as opposed to the consistently
“good” economy under no regime-switching, where the government is willing to intervene at a later
stage (at 60.34%). This occurs irrespective of the fact that all parameters take exactly the same values.
Clearly, the possibility of a future turn of events, leading to worse macroeconomic conditions, is what
makes the government more cautious about the future and willing to intervene more frequently so that
it is more prepared to deal with the worse economic scenario if and when it comes. This also results in
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the slight postponing of public investments under the possibility of such change from i = 2 to the worse
macroeconomic regime i = 1 (at a safer level 24.76%) compared to the slightly higher trigger level, when
the economy is consistently at a “good” state (at 24.85%).
Number of
Regime
Optimal boundaries (in %)
Regimes a b
N = 2
i = 1 22.5871 56.3248
i = 2 24.7630 58.2346
N = 1 24.8539 60.3393
Table 1. For this table we have used the following parameter values: r = 0.012, g = 0.015,
σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25; and, for the N = 2 case, the additional parameter’s
values: λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, q1 = 0.02, q2 = 0.02.
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